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1. Animal-machine and Animal-homunculus
Unable to find clear operational criteria for defining man, I have for-
merly chosen to characterise it thus: man is the only primate who guides 
his behaviour by prejudice. Now, one of the areas of human knowl-
edge, science, proposes to reflect critically on its own validity accord-
ing to demonstrable objectifying criteria, often quantifiable as well as 
open to refutation. Even the fabric of science, however, seeps prejudice, 
and temporary constructions (models and theories) that guide scientific 
research are open, in certain sensitive points, to manipulation and dis-
tortion aimed at another critical device – the common sense.
Under the guise of indifferent bonhomie, common sense reflects a 
trend of beliefs, which in a given cultural and historical context, take hold 
of partial, simple and seductive fragments of knowledge. Science pro-
ceeds a posteriori, following the renewed current of knowledge; common 
sense proceeds a priori, according to beliefs, desires and intuitions at 
the service of projects (religious, moral, ideological, utopian) which have 
always been intended to establish arbitrary power relations, opposed to 
the Enlightenment. This attitude disregards the testing procedure in the 
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context of the articulated unity of science. It prefers, instead, to proceed 
by isolated segments of knowledge, operating on the simplified inter-
pretations of these islands of information, while ignoring the complex 
and provisional findings that a true heuristic work would later perfect. 
Thus, between science and common sense – and despite the mutually 
exerted influences – opens a wide gap, which corresponds to the dis-
tinction between a knowledge that is never final, and a conjecture that 
is taken as reality.
It is appropriate, at this point, to survey the evolution of the concepts 
throughout the history of biological thought. At least since the Classi-
cal Age, and contrary to the expectations of the evolutionary model of 
Thomas Kuhn (1970), (non-human) animals have been regarded and 
interpreted either as mechanisms, or as homunculi (imperfect men, par-
tial, unfinished, immature). These two sides have been present in the 
history of zoology (itself plaited with the general history of ideas and the 
history of medicine) as the two sides of the Möbius’ strip. Either one of 
them – the animal-machine and the animal-homunculus – is accessible 
to common sense and, at the same time, open to a wise assessment of 
nature. Montaigne regarded animals as partial men, admitting that “ils 
ont un discours au dedans qui les rend aussi disciplinables et volontaires 
à apprendre” (they possess an inner discourse that makes them tameable 
and willing to learn) (Essais, II: XII). 
For Descartes, on the other hand, animal non agit, agitur, “the animal 
does not act, it is acted upon” (Discours de la méthode, V), and this is 
the view held by Malebranche. In the 18th century, when the essence of 
animal behaviour was not just scrutinised by philosophers but by natural-
ists, the conflicting paradigms persisted: Linné stressed the animal-ma-
chine, Buffon the animal-homunculus. “Sans l’existence des animaux”, 
he writes, “l’homme serait encore plus incompréhensible”. (Without the 
existence of animals, man would be even harder to understand). And 
Condillac, in his Traité des sensations, appeared in 1754, admits that 
animals can have representations and even communicate by means of 
some kind of language without words (Condillac, 1984). But soon Cuvier 
resumes, under a different perspective, the Cartesian view. “Cuvier had 
such an exalted concept of the perfection of the correlation of parts that 
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this was one of the major reasons why he could not conceive of any evo-
lutionary change”. (Mayr, 1982, p. 461). 
When Lamarck, after his inaugural lecture on the 21 Florival of year VIII 
of the Revolution (March 11, 1800) – the Discours d’ouverture (Lamarck, 
1807) – began teaching the evolution of all living beings as a continuum, 
a scala naturae, he accepted that the changes were operated and guided 
by an “adaptive conscience” ingrained within each organism1. Man being 
the last and the most developed stage of the Lamarckian chain, all other 
species shared a part of man’s nature. The very long title of Lamarck’s 
key work, which I transcribe below, hinted already at this conclusion: 
“Philosophie zoologique, ou Exposition des considérations relatives à l’his-
toire naturelle des Animaux; à la diversité de leur organisation et des 
facultés qu’ils en obtiennent; aux causes physiques qui maintiennent 
en eux la vie et donnent lieu aux mouvements qu’ils exécutent; enfin, à 
celles qui produisent, les unes le sentiment, et les autres l’intelligence de 
ceux qui en sont doués”.
With Darwin, from the publication in 1859 of The Origin of the Species 
by Means of Natural Selection, Lamarck’s gradualist transformism, open 
to common sense, gave way to a more complex evolutionary mechanism, 
less accessible to ordinary understanding. In certain points, however, still 
very close to Lamarck’s ideas (since Darwin did not have the basis for a 
grounded theory of heredity), Darwin stressed the animal-homunculus. 
This can be seen in the titles of the chapters and additions to the second 
edition of The Descent of Man, a book published in 1871, marking the 
motivational affinity between man and other animals. Thus: “Intelligence 
in a baboon”, “Sense of humour in dogs”, “Reasoning power in the lower 
animals”, “Power of abstraction in animals”. The concept of natural selec-
tion leans toward the animal-machine trend, while the concept of sexual 
selection (which Darwin compares with artificial selection, intentionally 
directed) leans toward the animal-subhuman pole.
Already the hyperseleccionist Alfred Russel Wallace (Gould, 1985) was 
an advocate of the animal-machine, and that was also the position of 
1  A few years earlier, Kant, in the second part of his Critique of Judgment had outlined 
an evolutionist project of living beings, comparing a democratic state to a living body, and 
a despotic state to a machine.
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August Weissmann, with his theory of “germ plasm”. Those close to 
Darwin had differing views; Romanes defended the intelligence of ani-
mals, while Lloyd Morgan excluded any conscious factor of causation 
of behaviour (in Thorpe, 1979). At the beginning of the 20th century, 
after the rediscovery of Mendel’s monograph, which finally brought the 
material basis for a theory of genetics, Hugo de Vries’ saltationism2 and 
Loeb’s theory of tropisms returned to the mechanical pole of the living 
beings; while Jennings postulated some form of memory and conscious-
ness even in protozoa (Jennings, 1927). 
Later, when behaviourists dissociated a narrow behavioural segment 
of the animal-machine, which they took for a model and paradigm to 
demonstrate an elementary system of learning, the Gestalt psychologists 
attributed to animals decisions and choices motivated by preferential 
stimuli. While William McDougall argued for his purposive psychology, of 
vitalist foundation, D’Arcy Thompson adopted a late-Pythagorean view, 
assuming the gradual transforming action of physical and geometrical 
forces acting on the morphological plan of each taxon, and extracting 
from it the configurations of each species, thus returning to the ani-
mal-machine (Thompson, 1961).
Meanwhile, Jacob von Uexküll demonstrated the sensory singularities 
of each species and indicated the position of each animal in their own 
world (Uexküll 1921). Though remaining a vitalist, he removed himself 
from the whole of the evolutionary scientific community. Von Uexküll 
was a researcher of the animal in its habitat, as well as a scrutiniser of 
the psychology of differently developed and complex species. He held, 
speaking of the tick Ixodes trianguliceps (one of the animals whose func-
tional cycle he elucidated): “this living being is a subject, who lives in its 
own world, of which it is the centre. One cannot, therefore, compare it 
to a machine, but to the project that drives the machine. (…) There is no 
portion of the body of the tick that resembles a machine, nevertheless, 
in all its parts there is a mechanism in action”. (Uexküll, op. cit.). 
2  Diverging from the gradualist model of evolution proposed by Darwin, De Vries 
admitted, based on an erroneous observation made in plants, that the formation of new 
species took place from macro-mutants, and that it operated on a single generation’s time 
(speciation by sudden jumps).
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In the 70s, the sociobiology of Edward Osborn Wilson reemphasised 
the animal-machine, with the “machine” comprising whole societies of 
animals – Wilson focused, mostly, on highly gregarious social insects, 
Isoptera (termites) and Hymenoptera (bees, wasps, ants). Later, he 
extrapolated his findings to human societies, being harshly criticised 
for epistemological incorrectness. The sociobiological model had yet 
another kind of complicity with common sense, by being compliant with 
the neoliberal society, which, in a way, it vouched for and announced. 
According to this view, the organisms are vehicles to spread and multiply 
genes, in analogy with the neoliberal societies, where human beings are 
vehicles to spread and multiply the capital.  
The dichotomy established by Wilhelm Dilthey between natural sci-
ences (focused on explanation and external observation) and human 
sciences (built on understanding and interiority, by co-empathy) helps 
us understanding the grounds for this long-lasting controversy, though 
it fails to solve it since, once again, it separates man from the remaining 
species. The fracture between sciences turned to the exterior and sci-
ences focused on inner search does not question the unity of nature; it 
questions, rather, the necessary method to approach it in all its bound-
aries.
The objectivist ethology of Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and Nico-
laas Tinbergen, aware of the behaviour of animals in their environment, 
soon distinguished the strict programmes and areas of learning, which 
were always manifest in each studied species (Lorenz, 1981). Let us hear 
one of the founders of ethology, William Thorpe: “It is true that science 
must always be objective. However, when we study living animals, who 
are, to some extent, similar to us, it is always salutary to put ourselves 
in their place, in our minds, considering what would we do under the 
same circumstances”. (Thorpe, op. cit.). Finally, the great theoretician 
Ernst Mayr proposed a clarifying model, by considering the greater or 
smaller openness of programs of each animal species to a certain degree 
of learning, from information encoded in the genome (Mayr, 1976). In 
this way, each species receives by phylogenetic inheritance a set of more 
or less rigid behavioural equipment, whose degree of modulation itself 
is genetically programmed.
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The curious historical dichotomy between innate and acquired knowl-
edge has livened up the epistemological and ideological debate between 
innateness and constructivism, which took the dimensions of an exten-
sive controversy and reached its peak in the 60s and the 70s of the 20th 
century. Man and human societies were the target of this discussion; the 
reliability of the method was its pretext. Those promoting the philoso-
phies of history before its decline showed preference for a “behaviourist” 
man, susceptible to radical change by absorbing and mimicking a doc-
trine, in order to thus alter the texture of society in a few generations’ 
time (without realising that human mimicry was a phylogenetic trait, with 
deep and frightful historical consequences): the postulate of a residue 
of any kind of fixed behavioural pattern was supposed to hinder such 
optimism.
The famous Royaumont encounters in the 70s and 80s confronted 
the positions, arguments and language of the innatists, amongst which 
was Chomsky, and those of the constructivists, which included Piaget 
(Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979). In fact, the work of the latter, conducted with 
children of different ages, and considered by some an example of ele-
gance and rigour, was refuted at a later point, as it did not account for 
the influence of mimic interactions between the researcher and the sub-
ject (e.g. at the moment when the subject had to choose between two 
options before the eyes of a researcher who, from the start, preferred 
one of the alternatives). Here we have how the nonverbal expression of 
behaviour – the role of expressive mimicry in communication – can dis-
tort the accuracy of an experiment that depends on the interaction of 
human beings, leading to the so-called rosenthalization of results. This 
designation derives from the name of the psychologist Robert Rosenthal, 
who devoted himself to prove the role of nonverbal communication in 
the interpersonal mediation of the effects of expectation.
2. The Synthetic Theory of Evolution
Nothing is more foreign to common sense than the idea of variational 
evolution and natural selection. Stephen Gould shows us the debris of the 
wreck of common sense against the Darwinist theory of evolution, and its 
appeal under Lamarck’s shadow: “I suspect a more important reason for 
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Lamarckism’s continuing appeal lies in its offer of some comfort against 
a universe devoid of intrinsic meaning for our lives. It reinforces two of 
our deepest prejudices – our belief that effort should be rewarded and 
our hope for an inherently purposeful and progressive world” (Gould, 
1980, p. 70).
“There is in Lamarckism a fundamental optimism (…) that man and 
societies are mouldable entities subject to rapid improvement by edu-
cational actions and consequential transformations on the individual or 
the group” (Sacarrão, 1989, vol. II, p. 300). For this order of reasons, the 
fake scientists Mitchurine and Lysenko, with the protection of the State, 
imposed on the Soviet Union’s farming in the 40s a neo-Lamarckian 
orientation ultimately aimed at obtaining “the new man”. Denounced by 
Lysenko, the respected researcher Nikolai Vavilov was arrested in 1940 
and was murdered in prison. Meanwhile, under the new momentum, the 
country’s economy collapsed, and hunger spread, annihilating millions of 
people, especially in the Ukraine. In the following decade, an analogous 
experience was imposed in China, with the same catastrophic results 
(Sacarrão, op. cit.). 
In fact, the man guided by common sense sees evolution according 
to the references of his own life: effort, rigour, and obedience guide his 
more or less successful progression, and will, tempered by experience, 
guide his learning. He who does not have his critical judgment poisoned 
by the biblical and fixist prejudice3 (nothing prevents that, ultimately, 
one believes that the Earth is flat, going back to Aristotle, and giving 
his senses the joy of reproducing immediately the shape of his beliefs) 
will find it easier to empathise with the intuitive arguments of Lamarck, 
than with the one long argument with which Darwin qualified his theory.
But there is an additional reason of irresistible appeal: the ascending 
and teleological character of the Lamarckian construct, which encapsu-
lates the collective impulse of will, of necessity and of hope (longing for 
perfection). It is the idea of a path towards a goal defined along the way, 
3  Up to this day, Jewish and Orthodox Christian groups, and the whole of the Muslim 
States hide, against all evidence, the reality of evolutionism, wanting, in many cases, to 
forbid its teaching and to censor its propagation. Such attitude, opposed to the ideas of 
the Enlightenment, can only arise from ignorance or bad faith.
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and the confusion between evolution and progress: man (under his only 
form known at the time, Homo sapiens Linée) becomes the destiny and 
the end point of evolution. All Lamarckians have cherished the nostalgia 
of this ruée vers l’homme (“a race towards man”), which, for believers, 
approaches the “omega point” of the design of Teilhard de Chardin (for 
an assessment of the meaning of his work, cf. Vieira, 2005).
In reality, man, either in the form of the current species, or in the form 
of his extinct species – i.e. including the paleospecies and the genus 
given by the taxonomists – is in the biosphere thanks to a random and 
opportunistic accident. Hominins appeared about more or less six million 
years before present. Homo sapiens has been around only very recently – 
around 200,000 years before the present day – and the extreme open-
ness of his programme, that natural selection has provided him, does 
not augur a long stay. Evolution abides to the principle of “evolutionary 
opportunism” (Dobzhansky, 1970) and proceeds as a result of unpredict-
able variations of environment. Moreover, the invention of evolutionary 
solutions lies in error – error in the replication of DNA, the very origin 
of mutations. 
No a priori purpose guides the evolution of the species. The Synthetic 
Theory of Evolution, which integrated the model of Darwin and popula-
tion genetics (Ronald Fischer, Sanderson Haldane, Sewall Wright, Sergei 
Chetverikov), opened a large multidisciplinary research programme that 
answers the “how” and the “why” of the evolutionary mechanism of the 
living, though without saying anything on the “what for”. All this disap-
points the man of common sense, who likes to be cradled in nationalis-
tic or historical triumphalism, sometimes, even in scatological utopias, 
giving meaning to his presence in the world and a reward to his destiny. 
Common sense only understands one of the stages of the selection 
process – that of necessity – not being able to conceive of the role of 
chance, borrowing two words from the famous book by Jacques Monod, 
Le hasard et la nécessité (Monod, 1970). 
After all, the pre-historical populations who started the domestication 
of some animal and plant species, changing the means of production 
of human groups and inaugurating the Neolithic period, intuited and 
practiced a selective form, on which, certainly, chance was absent and 
replaced by the “necessity” of the goal towards which the process was 
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directed. This evolutionary pressure initially postulated (aimed at, for 
instance, extracting from the wild wolf less feral strains, or making wild 
livestock less territorial and less aggressive) was denominated artificial 
selection. Darwin learnt of the concept and found in it a benchmark for 
his own theory: in nature, evolution progresses in a similar way, though 
the goal guiding it changes constantly, since Earth is active and the bio-
sphere changes according to several parameters. Thus, the evolution-
ary target is adaptation, never concluded, since it always has to face a 
changing environment.
The other side of the dynamics of selection, chance, would only become 
possible to explain based on the works of Mendel, lost to the scientific 
community for several decades. Therefore, Darwin’s troubles were in 
vain trying to come up with a theory of heredity, which, taking too long 
to shape, made him come closer to some of the Lamarckian postulates. 
Once the monograph of Gregor Mendel was found again, the basis of the 
laws named after their author, Darwin was no longer present. Only later, 
in the 30s and the 40s, did population genetics show the population key 
to evolution, leading to the Modern Synthesis proposed by Julian Huxley 
(Huxley, 1942). It was not the will of individuals, nor the advantage of the 
species, which led evolution towards adaptive acquisitions: what guided 
evolution was the variation between the individuals of a given population, 
within a determined environment under constant change.
Traits that seemed adaptive at a given moment or place could cease 
to be so in the short term (climate change, chemical or acidity changes 
of the soils, fauna and flora, predators and prey, parasites, vectors and 
hosts, etc.). Adaptive renewal is played from diversity, and the genes 
of the organisms better endowed regarding the new coordinates of the 
environment will be more represented in the following generations in 
the genetic pool of a given population, reaffirming by feedback the traits 
they convey. Therefore, when facing change, the differential reproduction 
of organisms responds with favourable traits, at the expense of those 
having maladaptive and counter-adaptive traits. In a few generations’ 
time, a trait can be multiplied or suppressed in this way under the effect 
of ecological pressures affecting populations.
Thus, genetic recombination produces random formulae, always differ-
ent, which arise through the combinatory process of meiosis as a cast of 
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the die on the gaming table – often valuable, but not always following the 
rules of the game. Ultimately, it is the error of replication that results in 
actual novelties (new genes, new characters, possibly useful against the 
new external conditions). The phenotypic traits (morphological, physi-
ological, biochemical, behavioural) resulting from a given formula of 
genotype are tested in the interaction with the environment, and the pro-
cess subjects them to a screening that will influence the genes from one 
generation to the other. In other words: from chance (the score marked 
on the die), necessity selects the formulae more suitable for adaptation. 
Since adaptation is insatiable, because the environmental change is never 
ending, selection progresses in unpredictable directions.
Common sense clashes with this complexity, eager for linear and defin-
itive solutions. Therefore, the prevailing view amongst the European 
educated classes (not the specialists) after the publication of The Origin 
has remained of Lamarckian flavour. This tendency was strengthened by 
the fact that the evolution of customs, of fashion, of values and beliefs, 
of language and history follows, apparently, an oriented direction, tele-
ological, accessible to understanding and approval, just like artificial 
selection. “A simple and dramatic theory that explains everything makes 
good press, good radio, good TV, and best-selling books. Anyone with 
academic authority, a halfway decent writing style, and a simple and 
powerful idea has easy entry to the public consciousness” (Lewontin, 
1993, p. vii).
Another factor disturbs the simple minds: the modifying action of 
selection adds occasional enhancements, step by step, to organisms 
whose basic morphological plan is thus modified in ways that will seem 
incoherent. Since the costs of a global remodelling of the pre-existing 
structure are huge, the bricolage is more affordable for evolution, impro-
vising small fixes to solve small defects, than the ideal remodelling of the 
whole morpho-physiological plan of an organism, and selection seizes 
these advantages and fixates these traits. According to the beautiful 
metaphor of François Jacob, evolution operates not by the design of an 
architect, but by the less costly improvisation of a bricoleur (Jacob, 1970). 
Hence the so-called phylogenetic inertia: an organ that used to have a 
function loses its purpose and, instead of being simply suppressed in a 
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given evolutionary line, shrinks and remains as a vestige. These struc-
tures are called vestigial organs.
There are numerous examples of such evanescent organs that per-
sist without a function. The case of the coccyx is exemplary. It is a 
bone present in anthropoids (therefore in hominins), where the caudal 
vertebrae are merged – vertebrae inherited from less evolved forms of 
primates, whose tail was free and had important functions (prehensile, 
balance, communication, etc). Henceforth useless, the caudal spine was 
not suppressed, but it atrophied and suffered this involution. Free still in 
human embryos, it persists later under the form of this small bone, which 
is articulated with the sacrum, and in which we can clearly distinguish 
the bodies of four or five vertebrae and the inter-vertebral symphyses. 
Scarcely ever does an anomaly result in human newborns bearing a free 
tail (Blanchard, 1885), but even Rudolph Virchow, vicious opponent of the 
idea of evolution, has observed this anomaly (Testut, 1904). On its own, 
the human coccyx and the coccyx of the pongids, considered in terms of 
comparative anatomy and embryology, illustrates and proves the bases 
of the evolutionist thought, showing the process of bricolage that goes 
hand in hand with evolution. No sensible god would have invented such 
an organ devoid of function4.
A unifying theory of evolution must be imagined on the larger stage of 
nature and in the critical intersection of natural sciences. For this reason, 
Lamarck, a museum naturalist, had the right intuition of the dynamic 
unity of living beings5; but it was Darwin and Wallace, seasoned travellers 
and multidisciplinary observers (zoology, botany, comparative anatomy, 
embryology, geology, fossils, biogeography) who managed to grasp the 
real mechanism of the process. It was this wide scope correlating data 
from different fields that led them to formulate the evolutionary theory 
based on variation, which remains inaccessible to the average man of 
common sense.
4  In fact, the coccyx still serves as attachment to some muscle fibres.
5  “Perhaps the fact that he had travelled so little was responsible for his lack of inter-
est (in problems of geography). In this he differs strikingly from the Darwinian generation” 
(Mayr, 1976, p. 2229).
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 The Swiss phenomenologist Ludwig Binswanger summed up the sit-
uation: “The crowd, the masses, do not learn anything, do not reflect 
on anything, do not know anything nor do they retain anything; they 
imagine, however, that they know something” (Binswanger, 1971, p. 26). 
Plato, in the Phaedrus, concentrated this idea in one statement: “They 
will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing”. Common 
sense, however, sees in the science of its time the ultimate revelation of 
truth. Pernicious ingenuity, alas, which projects the omnipotence of the 
ignorant in the task of science.
 How does one make he who is guided by the dictates of uncritical 
pragmatism admit that the natural sciences progress by the successive 
formulation of models, refuted and reformulated otherwise under the 
impact of the phenomena under observation? How can one show that, 
ultimately, objects remain opaque and deny us their ultimate truth? And 
yet, this “truth” suffers a slow and continuous approach, as the focus of 
an increasingly powerful microscope, every time more potent, more per-
fect, which spells out the hidden forms of nature without ever depleting 
them nor unravelling them to the end. Moreover, it is necessary to reflect 
on the ultimate sense of science in the light of a posthumous fragment of 
Nietzsche (Studienausgabe, 13: 333) according to which the foundation 
of science consists in applying to chaos a reading grid and in extracting 
from this operation not knowledge, but power.
In any case, there is in the sciences of nature a prodigious unity and 
coherence, which always incites new unveilings. Since the naturalists of 
Antiquity, biology (or what came to be called biology with Jean-Baptiste 
Monet, chevalier de Lamarck) resembled a dismembered Titan. Zoology, 
botany, geology, geography, morphology and systematics had developed 
side by side. Later came physiology, biological chemistry, palaeontology, 
embryology and many other disciplines that used to lay like disjointed 
pieces. Now, with the emergence of the Synthetic Theory of Evolution, the 
Titan was revived; the fragments of his body came together; the limbs 
found their proper place. Each of the newly reunited parts, restored, 
found its place on the whole and its raison d’être, each of them justify-
ing the others and taking from them their own justification. Ancient and 
new disciplines interbreed cohesive arguments, which mutually validate 
one another.
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The unity of science reflected the unity of nature6, the logic of the 
former matching the wholeness of the other. Thus, the new evolutionist 
thinking, based on the descent from a common ancestor, constituted 
the great epistemic breakthrough in life sciences. It widened the field 
of research (nowadays with a huge scope, from molecular biology to 
social biology) but, at the same time, it was submitted to the pressure of 
the established powers, of tradition, of prejudice. The man of common 
sense, who sees with only one eye, as the Cyclops, does not grasp the 
breadth and the beauty of this new way of observing the world – neither 
the diversity of spaces nor the depth of times evoked (the geological 
eras).
3. Racism, Theory and Common Sense
As the work of science approaches the inquiry on the position of man 
in nature, the powerful currents of prejudice blow as a whirlwind to 
obscure the criteria of proof. In these problematic spaces, ideologies 
come into play, seeking the validation of biological models, manipulating 
science and disseminating, among men of common sense, these ready-
to-use distortions. More disturbing still, the very scientific theoreticians, 
contaminated by l’air du temps or by their own convictions, conceded 
to this complicity and extracted from it an ephemeral glory. One of the 
examples that run through the history of biological anthropology is the 
trend seeking to justify racism on theoretical grounds.
The misunderstanding at the birth of modern racism, of a pseudo-sci-
entific brand, goes back to Darwin himself. Once the decisive arguments 
for his theory were collected, it seemed obvious that the human species 
would have, as any other species, a phylogenetic natural history. At first, 
Darwin hardly mentioned it. In The Origin of the Species he only makes 
one discreet reference to man, on the penultimate page of the book: 
“Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history”. This 
6  A fine example of the articulated unity of nature is given by the recent observation 
that dung beetles of South Africa (Scarabaeus satyrus), taxonomically related to the Egyp-
tian sacred beetles, find orientation in their nocturnal movements – in which they roll a 
ball of dung where the eggs are laid – in the glow of the Milky Way. Natural selection has 
fixated this sign-stimulus, contained in the sensorial spectrum of the beetle and inscribed 
in their behaviour programme (Dacke et al., 2013).
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 19, 2017
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Evolutionism and Common Sense
28
sentence was erased, also discreetly, from the first German edition of 
the essay, revealing how much it disturbed common sense in a country 
of Lutheran tradition. Twelve years later, Darwin dedicated part of his 
book The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Darwin, 1871) 
to the evolution of man.
The then scarcity of known fossils of human lineage limited the factual 
demonstration of the theses advanced in the book. But humanity occu-
pied, naturally, a branch in the tree of living beings and was connected 
to pre-human and non-human ancestors no longer in existence. As chim-
panzees and gorillas (bonobos were not yet recognised as a distinct spe-
cies) were the closer relatives of man in the present, Darwin postulated 
that the continent where they lived, Africa, would have been the starting 
point of humanity, as it would be later confirmed. Lacking a compelling 
genetic theory and effective means of dating, he has deducted from his 
theory what would have been the evolutionary path between pre-human 
hominoids and the man of the present day. And he concluded, wrongly, 
that certain current human populations, on the periphery of civilisation, 
with their strange customs and without a writing system, represented 
residues of archaic populations, less evolved and doomed to disappear.
He believed, even, to have observed one such population when the 
Beagle sailed along the shores of Tierra del Fuego and the crew spotted 
the Fuegians (Vieira, 2009–2010). Thinking that the technologic back-
wardness of that people was due to a biological backwardness that would 
destine them to upcoming extinction, he has not even valued the fact that 
some of those Fuegians, captured and taken to England, quickly learnt 
English and even converted to Christianity.
Let us compare two of Darwin’s texts. In the Beagle Diary under the 
entry of the 18th of December 1832, he wrote: “It was without exception 
the most curious & interesting spectacle I ever beheld. – I would not have 
believed how entire the difference between savage & civilised man is. – It 
is greater than between a wild & domesticated animal. (…) – Their lan-
guage does not deserve to be called articulate. (...) I believe if the world 
was searched, no lower grade of man could be found” (Darwin, 1988). 
And then, thirty-nine years later, in The Descent of Man, with the whole 
of his theory already elaborated, he wrote: “Whether primeval man, when 
he possessed but few arts, and those of the rudest kind, and when his 
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power of language was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to be 
called man, must depend on the definition which we employ” (Darwin, 
1871, vol. I, p. 279).
The diversity of the phenotypic and cultural aspects prevented the 
always watchful and serene Darwin from taking more cautious conclu-
sions. He would hesitate, even, in concluding the taxonomic distance 
which separated these “residual” people from civilised populations: “In a 
series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man 
as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point when 
the term ‘man’ ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little impor-
tance (…) whether the so-called races of man are thus designated, or are 
ranked as species or sub-species; but the latter term appears the more 
appropriate” (Darwin, op. cit., pp. 279–280). An amazing doubt coming 
from someone who had observed the Brazilian populations where Euro-
peans, Africans and Amerindian would mix without limitation of fertility. 
Surely the boundaries between species, the reproductive isolation on 
the basis of the very definition of species, and the speciation phenom-
enon, unknown to Darwin, made him think here in terms of a scala 
naturae. In the end, it was the universality of emotive mimicry (Darwin, 
1872), which forced him to admit the unity of man beyond the diversity 
in appearance and the disparity of cultural behaviour.
The appropriation of Darwin’s ideas, as the publications kept coming 
out, illustrates a gift of science to common sense. Herbert Spencer and 
Francis Galton applied erroneous conclusions of an incomplete theory to 
the Victorian ideology, and began the movement known as “social Dar-
winism”, completely foreign to the ideas of the great scientist7. In Ger-
many – at the same time as the fixist racism of Rudolph Virchow – Ernst 
Haeckel, one of the first adepts of Darwinism, outlined an evolutionist 
7  Darwin, privately, on Spencer: “I did not like him particularly, and did not feel that I 
could easily have become intimate with him. I think he was extremely egotistical. (…) I am 
not conscious of having profited in my own books by Spencer’s writings. His deductive 
manner of treating every subject is wholly opposed to my frame of mind. His conclusions 
never convince me. His fundamental generalisations (...) are of such a nature that they do 
not seem to me to be of any strictly scientific use. They partake more of the nature of defi-
nition than of laws of nature. (…) Anyhow they have not been of any use to me” (Barlow, 
1958, pp. 108–109). 
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 19, 2017
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Evolutionism and Common Sense
30
racism, without any factual basis (the finding of the Pithecanthropus 
erectus by Eugène Dubois would come later). In one of his books, Haeckel 
included a conjectural genealogy of primates, containing a few expres-
sive neologisms. Of a Protohylobates alalus he made derive obliquely 
to one side the Asian anthropoids, and to the other the African great 
apes; and vertically, upwards, the direct ancestors of man, who would 
be: first the Protohylobates alalus and, between this and Homo sapiens, 
there would have been a Homo stupidus. From the ascending segment, 
between stupidus and sapiens, he marked the lateral branches that would 
have led to the “non-white races” (Haeckel, 1905).
From the end of the 19th century to the 40s of the 20th century, racist 
models multiplied in the name of evolutionary science: the racial-evolu-
tionary neurology and the craniometry (Broca, Topinard); the “degener-
ationist” psychiatry (Morel, Magnan, Lombroso, Down); the evolutionary 
anthropology (Tylor, Morgan, Frazer, Carlton Coon, William Howells); the 
eugenic ideologies (Gobineau, Vacher de Lapouges); the “partial neoteny” 
(Bolk); the racist genetics (Galton, Davenport, Cuénot, William Bateson) 
(cf. Vieira 1995 for an analysis of these concepts). And, during the years 
of World War I, the “Piltdown fraud” was perpetrated aiming at falsifying 
the understanding of human evolution, attempting to place the vener-
able “ancestor” in England, and attributing to him anatomical features 
completely opposed to those of the true African ancestors.
One of the rare scientists of this time resisting scientific manipulation 
was Wallace, the co-founder of the theory of the evolution of species by 
natural selection. He, who had always accepted that Darwin had primacy 
in the great discovery; he, who had coined the very word “darwinism”, 
did not follow the master after the publication of The Descent of Man. 
The fact that the “primitive” (who, in different degrees, he had met in 
the field, on his expeditions, first to Amazonia and later to the Malay 
Archipelago) managed to survive in adverse environments, such as the 
swampy forest, led him to admit that their brain had capacities equal to 
those of the brain of the civilised man. “In the brain of the lowest sav-
ages, and, as far as we know, of the prehistoric races, we have an organ 
(brain) little inferior in size and complexity to that of the highest type” 
(Wallace, in Gould, 1985, p. 66).
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This perspective led him to subtract human brain from the selective 
process – a pathetic mistake that sent him towards a kind of natural the-
ology and set him into theoretic dissent against Darwin, with whom he 
kept exchanging letters, henceforth assuming his position as unusual 
(“my own heresy”, he would tell him). Such serious misunderstanding 
contrasts with Wallace’s otherwise hyperselectionist views, according 
to which any morphological or physiological trait in any taxon would be 
subjected to natural selection8. Darwin, in his answers, would send him 
words of warning, e.g. in a letter written in 1869: “I hope you have not 
murdered too completely your own and my child”. Fatal condescendence 
to common sense, which falls more on the person of its author – scien-
tist, traveller, collector, anthropologist, socialist and, in his last years, 
theosofist – than on diverging observations. Again, the a priori prejudice 
weighs on reason and on the logic of the facts.
During the 20th century, physical anthropology, a science founded 
by Aleš Hrdlička, still produced several models of racist content. In the 
60s, this science gave place to a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
research programme, called palaeoanthropology, which investigates the 
origins and evolution of man, including his genome, morphology, lan-
guage and behaviour. From the 80s, with the advent of molecular biol-
ogy, palaeoanthropologists have demonstrated, based on the compara-
tive study of mitochondrial DNA and the so-called “mitochondrial clock”, 
that Homo sapiens was of African origin (as Darwin had claimed), recent 
(around 200,000 years before the present day), and had departed from 
a “genetic bottleneck”, from which a limited number of breeding couples 
with mutant traits had endowed modern humanity with a homogeneous 
genetic pool, which is how it keeps its unity. The large number of today’s 
mankind has a greater genetic homogeneity than two different popu-
lations of wild chimpanzees. As a consequence, the concept of “race” 
has lost all its operational value in anthropology and anthropological 
systematics.
8  Hyperselectionism, definitely refuted, claimed that all traits of living beings were 
the result of a selective process, configuring an entirely adapted nature, something like 
“the best of worlds” in Leibniz’s metaphysics. The Leibnizian idea was also dear to Louis 
Agassiz, the famous North American scientist, who opposed Darwin’s ideas. We know now 
that the great majority of traits are adaptively neutral (Kimura, 1968).
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Even so, common sense remains open to the fantasy of the existence 
of “human races”. Why is that so? Because, unable to mobilise the effort, 
the necessary distance and critical capacity to integrate the set of conclu-
sions in the various converging lines of research, common sense indulges 
in the simplistic view of a racial fracture in mankind. Obsessed by an 
explanation that suits its prejudice, it ignores or minimises the facts that 
do not fit. Meanwhile, it takes note of the flagrant phenotypic differences 
between human beings (e.g. skin colour, average height, straightness of 
hair, flatness of the ala of the nose) without being willing to accept that 
they result from the action of a minimal number of genes. On the other 
hand, common sense takes the cultural and civilizational variations as a 
reflection of different cognitive capacities. The tendency is deeply rooted 
in humankind, where many groups call themselves men and consider 
foreigners sub-human or not human at all.
Wilsonian sociobiology, intrinsically non-racist by the emphasis put on 
a certain “human condition”, has not prevented fantasies such as those 
expressed by Edward Osborn Wilson himself in his book On Human 
Nature: “Imagine our moral distress if australopithecine man-apes had 
survived to the present time, halfway in intelligence between chimpan-
zees and human beings, forever genetically separated from both, evolv-
ing just behind us in language and the higher faculties of reason. What 
would be our obligation to them? What would the theologians say – or 
the Marxists, who might see in them the ultimate form of an oppressed 
class? (…) But even worse, imagine our predicament if we coexisted with 
a mentally superior human species, say Homo superbus, who regarded 
us, the minor sibling species Homo sapiens, as the moral problem” (Wil-
son, 1978, pp. 50–51). 
This weighing of moral duties due to a conjectural population of 
non-human hominins calls for ethical and juridical considerations, such 
as those that have been raised regarding anthropoids in captivity (labo-
ratories, zoos, circuses, private residences)9. As for Homo superbus, he 
projects perhaps the fantasy of certain intellectuals of placing themselves 
above the rest of humankind, as if they would form a “race” destined 
9  Without forgetting that we are similar, to varying degrees, to all living beings in the 
biosphere, with whom we share a greater or smaller percentage of genetic material.
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to a superior fate, but unfairly deprived of the privileges they believe 
they deserve. And after all, this Homo superbus emerges on the hori-
zon of possibilities: at the moment when science has demystified and 
condemned the concept of “race” inherited from the first evolutionists, 
genetic engineering gives us the ability to inhibit deleterious genes and 
to add to human embryos protective genes, able to equip them for lon-
ger and healthier lives, but at the price of turning them, eventually, into 
another subspecies. Here is how the wrongly founded racism of the past 
shall resurface, perhaps, in the future, this time with a real genetic basis.
In every moment of the history of scientific ideas10, and despite the 
general acceptance of the cumulative character of science, befalls the 
conviction that we can finally judge critically the scientists of the past, 
smile at their interpretations and concessions, dear to the dominant 
ideas of their time and, ultimately, of common sense. Sheer folly: sci-
entists of the future shall weave identical critical comments about us.
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